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Regulatory “capture” is central to regulatory theory and the eco-
nomic analysis of regulation.  It lies at the heart of public and social
choice theory and it is a concept adopted by conservative and liberal
theorists alike.1  Capture theory has, since the 1960s, influenced the de-
* Visiting Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law.  This Paper
originally prepared as background for panelist remarks at the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law Symposium, Fordham Law School, New York, N.Y., February 7, 2011.  I
would like to thank Rebecca Dunning, Ed Balleisen, and Anat Admati for valuable general
suggestions, Ron Backus of the MITRE Corporation for his guidance regarding the organiza-
tion, and the participants of the Symposium, from whom I learned a lot about the nuances of
capture theory.
1 See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT Commis-
sion (Princeton Univ. Press 1955) (evaluating the role of independent regulatory commissions
in government regulation); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1969) (discussing clientel-
ism resulting from delegation and accommodation of interest groups); MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (rep. ed. 1971)
(discussing collective action problems in counteracting organized groups); Sam Peltzman, To-
ward a More General Theory of Regulation, J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976) (discussing social
choice); George T. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3 (1971) (discussing public choice). See also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 QTRLY. J.
ECON. 1089 (1991) (broadening capture theory toward a more dynamic perspective); Joel A.
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velopment of two entirely opposing approaches to regulation: on the one
hand, it provided impetus to the “deregulation movement” because mar-
kets were considered less susceptible to undue influence than regulatory
agencies, and on the other, it led to attempts to pinpoint faithful imple-
mentation of legislative policy through the creation of single executive
(and therefore directly accountable) agencies designed to implement so-
cial policies.2
The concept of capture has seductive moral power because it con-
veys a sense of illegitimate expropriation, performed by one powerful
group over others, of the resources we might have thought were provided
for a broader social benefit.  Moreover, evidence of capture seems to leap
out at us from the very statements by, professed motivations of, and po-
litical contributions from, well organized interest groups.  The direction
of specific policy outcomes often makes it easy to attribute the result to
excessive influence of a group, or groups, whose views seemed most to
support that result and who devoted the most resources to ensuring that
outcome.
I.  UNPACKING CAPTURE
A. Surface Capture
The concept of capture is not very reliable—whether as a descrip-
tive or a normative tool—for understanding regulatory dysfunction.
Though usually used quite simplistically in economic modeling, capture
might take many forms and is likely to be a matter of degree.  Conse-
quently, differences of opinion abound as to whether capture has even
occurred.
Capture is also notoriously difficult to define.  As a working defini-
tion, this paper regards regulatory capture to be present whenever a par-
ticular sector of the industry, subject to the regulatory regime, has
acquired persistent influence disproportionate to the balance of interests
envisaged when the regulatory system was established.  Yet this defini-
tion immediately begs questions, such as when influence is “persistent,”
or what the “balance of interests envisaged” really is?  For many reasons,
good and bad, it is almost certain that some individuals or groups will
have more influence than others, thus, another important question is
which groups should have greater influence, and when does greater influ-
ence represent a distortion of the process.
Mintz, Has Industry Captured the EPA?: Appraising Marver Bernstein’s Captive Agency The-
ory After Fifty Years, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2005) (assessing the validity of Bern-
stein’s capture theory as applied to the EPA); Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974) (arguing for a more tentative endorse-
ment of capture theory over public interest theory).
2 See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION 303–04 (1984).
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There is often another complicating and more fundamental factor at
play: it might be that the regulatory regime appears “captured” because
the legislature that created this regime was itself captured by “special
interests” and, as a result, has produced a regime predestined to captured
results favoring those interests.3  Figuring out where capture begins is
itself both an empirical and a political question.  Do we treat democratic
legislative results as a given and therefore prior to regulatory capture
analysis because the legislative process itself was democratic?  If so, and
if regulators are merely carrying out legislative will, then the rest of the
capture inquiry would be little more than a waste of time.4
Scholars have shown regulatory capture, as an analytical concept, to
be both indeterminate and sometimes not supported by the facts.5  It is
indeterminate because a legislature may have adopted a particular policy
because it is the right one and not because certain groups might have
bought or paid for the policy (even though this might perhaps also have
happened).  Just because the result is supported by a powerful and organ-
ized group does not necessarily imply that it is wrong.  This highlights
the fundamental causal problem that capture theory does not satisfacto-
rily address.6
The concept is also unsupported in significant situations where the
legislature apparently adopted policies in the face of powerful opposition
that would, under capture theory, have suggested a different result.7  One
3 See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 341–43
(1988).
4 See infra note 16 (discussing the likely views of state banks in reaction to passage of
the National Bank Act of 1863).
5 For critiques of regulatory capture see, for example, Daniel Carpenter, Confidence
Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD
A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 164, 165, 170–73 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss
eds., 2010); Steven Croley, Interest Groups and Public Choice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 49, 56–58 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds.,
2010); Jessica Leight, Public Choice: A Critical Reassessment, in GOVERNMENT AND MAR-
KETS 213, 230–38 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010).  For a rich exploration
of the dimensions and deficiencies of both public interest and capture theory, and an attempt to
develop a more complex model for understanding the process of sound policy formation, see
Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (Special Issue 1990). See also Susan
Webb Yackee, Reconsidering Agency Capture During Regulatory Policymaking, in PREVENT-
ING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1–3
(Daniel Carpenter, Steven P. Croley & David A. Moss, eds., forthcoming 2011) (unpublished
manuscript dated July 8, 2011) (manuscript at 5–10) (on file with author) (presenting a thor-
ough analysis of the theoretical dimensions of the capture concept and ways of testing empiri-
cally the existence and degree of agency capture).
6 See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 35–43 (2010) [hereinafter CARPENTER, REPUTA-
TION AND POWER] (discussing regulation, its theories, and externalities).
7 See, e.g., David A. Moss & Mary Oey, The Paranoid Style in the Study of American
Politics, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS, supra note 5, at 256, 257 (describing three major
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could easily argue that in such situations, other powerful interests have
prevailed; but once one starts making this kind of concession, the con-
cept becomes so diluted that it quickly loses analytical value.
Capture can also be unhelpful, even counterproductive, because it is
hurled back and forth between competing interest groups, or “factions,”8
as an accusation—sometimes little more than an insult—rather than a
constructive diagnosis.9  This leads to adversarial responses.  Such con-
troversy is not surprising given that regulatory capture is an idea borne
out of the flat rhetorical rejection of any objective “public interest”: after
all, if policy is simply the product of a zero sum game in which there are
only winners and losers, then public policy can be no more than the
spoils of victory, with losers left only to lament the capture of the prize
by others.  Under this view, capture is a concept embedded in an adver-
sary model not only of politics but also of policy itself.
There are more problems.  Capture is offered as an antidote to the
supposed political naı¨vete´ of the “public interest” theory of policy forma-
tion.10  Yet the notion of an opposing, public interest theory is itself
largely a straw man set up by capture theorists to advance their models.11
There is no simplistic public interest school of public policy: as Daniel
Carpenter has observed, “[t]he term is much more commonly used by
capture and rent-seeking theorists” and “‘public interest’ is less a body of
theory and more a descriptive label used by critics of an earlier era’s
scholarship.”12
To make useful assessments on whether something like capture has
occurred, we have to make much more precise distinctions about “regu-
lation” and “regulators” than public choice economists are inclined to
make.13  This is evident in the world of financial regulation, where there
are many dimensions of “regulation.”
For example, what is the purpose of the legislation creating the reg-
ulatory framework?  Sometimes the legislation under which the regula-
tors act expressly authorizes favorable treatment of one group over
examples—voting rights, Medicare, and Superfund—in which “special interests appear to
have given way to the general interest in the policymaking process”); see also David B.
Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97,
122–23 (discussing the ongoing influence battle that does not end with the passage of legisla-
tion, precisely because that legislation is itself often contrary to industry interests—which
should not be the case if the capture theory of legislation was resilient).
8 See infra note 67.
9 PHILLIP J. COOPER, THE WAR AGAINST REGULATION: FROM JIMMY CARTER TO
GEORGE W. BUSH 11 (2009).
10 See CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 6, at 38.
11 See id. at 36–37.
12 Id. at 37.
13 See id. at 38.
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another.14  The National Bank Act provides a good example; it was en-
acted specifically to promote the development of a national banking sys-
tem for the sake of the public interest.15  As Justice Strong famously
declared in a case favoring national banks over state banks, “National
banks have been National favorites.”16  Sometimes it is perfectly appro-
priate, and even statutorily required, for the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC), which is charged with applying the Act, to promote
the interests of national banks over other competing interests.17  Yet this
does not mean that the Comptroller is therefore captured by the national
banking industry and thereby not acting in the public interest.18
Furthermore, there are many kinds of regulators with many kinds of
missions.19  In the financial world there are regulators who, like the OCC
and state banking commissions, are primarily established to create and
promote an industry.20  There are others, like the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and the newly created Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, whose mission is to regulate the business conduct of
those industries.21  Others, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
(FDIC) and even the chartering agencies such as the OCC, have the im-
portant “micro-prudential” mission of preventing institutional failure, to
protect depositors, shareholders or even the general public.22  There are
“macro-prudential” regulators, such as the Federal Reserve and the new
Financial Stability Oversight Council, whose mission, among others, is
financial stability.23  And some, such as the FDIC, play the role of under-
taker in ensuring “orderly liquidation” of financial companies that have
14 See William Isaac, Bank Regulatory System Out of Balance, AMERICAN BANKER, Feb.
6, 2006, available at http://www.williamisaac.com/published-works/bank-regulatory-system-
out-of-balance/ (“The OCC . . . [is] charged by statute with promoting the interests of national
banks and federal thrifts.”) (last visited August 26, 2011).
15 See History, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.
gov/about/history.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (discussing the history of the National Bank
Act and the public interest reasons for its implementation).
16 Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Miss., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873).  The opponents of a national
banking system, of which there were many, would no doubt have argued that Congress had
been captured by special interests when it enacted the legislation in the first place.
17 See Isaac, supra note 14.
18 This does not mean that the legislature, in creating a pro-industry regulator such as the
OCC, has been effective in ensuring promotion of the public (as opposed to industry) interest.
On the contrary, it is later suggested that recent events show this to be a fundamental design
flaw. See infra text accompanying notes 101–03.
19 See HEIDI M. SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: PRIN-
CIPLES AND POLICIES 260–65 (2010).
20 See id.
21 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203
§ 1011 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd–Frank Act].
22 See SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 56–59, 95–97.
23 See id. at 268–71.
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become insolvent.24  These distinctions are important if we are to attain
any degree of precision when talking about capture.
Except perhaps in some extreme situations, the surface concept of
capture does not even plausibly describe the overall process of policy
formation.  This is not only because “influence is not quite the same
thing as control,”25 but also because the direct focus on capture theory
inconsistently and wrongly presupposes simple linear influences on the
emergence of policy.  Yet many fluctuating and buffeting forces interact
to determine results that are seldom the “logical” result of the inputs
involved.  Policy, as much as market prices, is the result of a process in
which the result is an emergence from the process, not the linear sum of
its parts.26
Finally, there is a strange irony to the position of some capture theo-
rists.  Capture is a central tenet for adherents of the rational choice school
of economics and public choice school of public policy, and is a basis for
preferring market discipline to regulation in most circumstances.27
Under this model, however, market forces, supposedly less susceptible to
capture themselves, are likely to provide a more reliable means of gener-
ating efficient or “utility maximizing” results.28  “Efficiency,” under the
rational choice model, has in effect become a substitute for public inter-
est.  The irony is that market discipline theorists celebrate the efficient
results of properly functioning markets by tirelessly reiterating Adam
Smith’s overworked metaphor of the “invisible hand,”29 yet the efficient
24 See Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, tit. II.  For a general discussion of financial agency
types, see SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 259–77.
25 Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying Emergent Solutions
for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 484, 534 (2009).
26 “Emergence” is a complicated concept connoting a condition, state, or quality that
evolves from the systemic interaction of diverse agents within a complex system and it is not
the linear sum of those inputs.  For example, the “wetness” of water is not the mere sum of
H2O molecules, nor is “mind” just the accumulation of brain tissue powered by electrical
impulses between neural connections. See, e.g., JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 44–53
(Princeton Univ. Press 2007); Julianne D. Halley & David A. Winkler, Classification of Emer-
gence and its Relation to Self-Organization, COMPLEXITY, May/Jun. 2008, at 10, http://online
library.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.20216/pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
27 See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE vol. 1 at 267 (Charles Kershaw
Rowley & Friedrich Schnieder eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004) (“[T]he public choice
model stresses that issues of income distribution will tend to carry greater weight in the public
policy process than concerns of economic efficiency. . . .  Depending on the policy process in
question, the beneficiaries of regulation may turn out to be almost any well-organized special-
interest group.  Owing to the fact that ‘the public’ is numerous, geographically dispersed, and,
in general, unorganized politically, its influence on the policy process is necessarily weak.
Public regulation of private industry therefore will rarely, if ever, serve the public’s interest.”).
28 On the incoherence of the “utility maximization” claims of public choice theory, see
for example, Leight, supra note 5, at 225–30.
29 Gavin Kennedy, Adam Smith and the Invisible Hand: From Metaphor to Myth, 6
ECON. J. WATCH 239 (2009).
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result is mysteriously generated by the collective energy of myriads of
selfishly motivated market participants.30  However, public and social
choice theorists seem to implicitly deny the possibility that any analo-
gous public interest may similarly emerge through the process of policy
formation.  By the same logic, properly designed regulation—a product
of competing forces—would surely also lead to an efficient or utility
maximizing result.
B. Structural Capture
So capture seems at first to be rather deficient as a tool for analyz-
ing the performance of regulators.  It turns out, however, to be very rele-
vant in the context of contemporary financial regulation for two distinct
reasons.  First, the overt conduct of the industry and various high regula-
tory officials appears to demonstrate the kind of extreme situation in
which one of the regulated interests—namely the very large financial
institutions—have secured such dominant influence that it may be said
that they have captured the regulators, the regulatory process, and the
regulatory outcomes, to the disregard of many other important
interests.31
Examples of recent strong industry bias on the part of key financial
regulators seem to abound.  There is ample evidence from various regu-
latory actions that the industry, particularly large financial organizations,
have enjoyed surprising favor at the hands of the financial regulators.
The Office of Thrift Supervision has been excoriated in a detailed Sena-
torial report for its pro-industry laxity.32  The OCC has used its interpre-
tive powers to enable national banks to evade long-standing legislative
restrictions on their activities, whether geographic or product restric-
tions.33  The Federal Reserve, charged with maintaining prudential
30 This is not an unreasonable claim, as countless highly efficient, diverse markets seem
to demonstrate and complexity theory would support. See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Complexity
and the Economy, 284 SCIENCE 107, 108 (Apr. 1999). See generally MELANIE MITCHELL,
COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 9–10 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
31 See, e.g., James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 1–3 (Daniel
Carpenter, Steven P. Croley, and David A. Moss, eds.) (forthcoming 2011) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author).
32 STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SE-
CURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 112TH CONG., J. REP. ON WALL STREET AND THE FI-
NANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 161–242 (2011), available at http://
hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=51
bf2c79-5056-8059-76a0-6674916e133d.
33 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
“Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) (discussing deregulation of activi-
ties); Elizabeth R. Schiltz, Damming Watters: Channeling the Power of Federal Preemption of
State Consumer Banking Laws, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (2008) (discussing geographic and
product deregulation); Comment, The New American Universal Bank, 110 HARV. L. REV.
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firewalls between corporate subsidiary structures, has deployed tortured
interpretive techniques to permit their breach.34  And the SEC notori-
ously adopted a “consolidated supervised entities” policy that in effect
freed large financial companies from prior leverage restrictions and ena-
bled them to reach the dangerous levels of leverage that have been identi-
fied as a major reason for the financial collapse in 2008.35  Financial
regulation might therefore have come to reflect just the kind of extreme
situation in which capture accurately describes the result of our regula-
tory policy.
Secondly, when one turns from the shallow concept of visible cap-
ture, which has been the focus of the earlier discussion, to the “deep
capture”36 that might be embedded within the financial regulatory sys-
tem, the evidence seems to accumulate even more rapidly.  This suggests
that our financial and economic public policy process has been systemat-
ically captured by large-scale financial interests.  The leading exponents
of the theory of deep capture have described their use of the term as
follows:
By “deep capture,” . . . we . . . refer to the disproportion-
ate and self-serving influence that the relatively powerful
tend to exert over all the exterior and interior situational
features that materially influence the maintenance and
extension of that power—including those features that
purport to be, and that we experience as, independent,
volitional, and benign.  Because the situation generally
tends to be invisible (or nearly so) to us, deep capture
tends to be as well.37
To understand capture from this perspective we must reach beyond
surface connections that suggest causality and the attribution of out-
comes to obvious inputs; instead, we have to consider the implicit as-
sumptions, shapes, and channels of information that ultimately,
notwithstanding professed views and objectives, drive perceptions and
1310 (1997) (discussing OCC development of its “operating subsidiary rule” to enable national
banks to get into the business of insurance and securities underwriting).
34 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd–Frank: The Unful-
filled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 101 (2011).
35 See, e.g., Ben Protess, “Flawed” SEC Program Failed to Rein in Investment Banks,
PROPUBLICA Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.propublica.org/article/flawed-sec-program-failed-to-
rein-in-investment-banks-101.
36 For a discussion of “deep capture,” see Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation:
An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202–84 (2003).
37 Id. at 218. See also Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 2009, at
48–50 (developing a case that our financial regulators and policy have become victim to a
pervasive cultural capture that promotes the interests of large financial institutions to the detri-
ment of financial stability).
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decisions.38  There could be various dimensions of this type of capture,
including “cultural”39 and “social”40 capture.  Here, the entire language
of the policy debate is shaped by an elite group that has gained domi-
nance in promoting and controlling policy outcomes; further, the lan-
guage of regulation is shaped by the common backgrounds, education,
experience, and intermingling of the more powerful players in the policy
formation process.41
Perhaps equally insidious are the subtle conflicts of interest created
by academics that are dependent on industry sponsored research, or de-
riving income from industry associations such as directorships.  A recent
study on the activities of academic economists suggests that the conflicts
are sufficiently real as to require a code of ethics, including fuller disclo-
sures when economists take public positions on policy issues.42  This
industry-academic relationship might significantly distort our under-
standing of the true relationship between industry and the regulators.
James Kwak, in an illuminating analysis, has characterized the kind
of deep capture evident in financial services regulation as “cultural cap-
ture.”43  He notes that the potential recruits to the financial agencies are
less likely to be committed ideologically to constraining the industries
they will regulate than are recruits to agencies specifically established for
38 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 36, at 177–79 (discussing how and why our sur-
face assumptions do not reliably reflect the basis for decisions and action and, therefore, can
lead to inaccurate attribution of cause and effect).
39 See, e.g., Kwak, supra note 31; SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE
WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 89–90 (Pantheon Books
2010); Johnson, supra note 37, at 50 (describing the “cultural capital” amassed by the financial
industry, creating a network that ensures massive influence among colleagues, former col-
leagues, and other socially and vocationally connected individuals who collectively control the
levers of government decision-making in matters relating to the financial system); see infra
text accompanying notes 43–47.
40 See Steven M. Davidoff, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Jun. 11, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-govern
ments-elite-and-regulatory-capture/.
41 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 39, at 92–104.
42 See Gerald Epstein & Jessica Carrick-Hangenbarth, Financial Economists, Financial
Interests And Dark Corners of the Meltdown: It’s Time to Set Ethical Standards for the Eco-
nomics Profession 25–28 (Univ. of Mass. Amherst, Political Econ. Research Inst., Working
Paper No. 239, 2010) (reviewing the writings and media appearances of nineteen economists
between 2005 and 2009); see also, Seth Lobove & Oliver Staley, Schools Find Ayn Rand can’t
be Shrugged as Donors Build Courses, BLOOMBERG, May 5, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-05-05/schools-find-ayn-rand-can-t-be-shrugged-as-donors-build-courses.html
(describing the growing number of wealthy donors who are attaching ideological academic
conditions to their donations); Catherine Rampell, Buying Influence at Universities, N.Y.
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (May 12, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/
05/12/buying-influence-at-universities/; Nancy Folbre, Economics for sale, N.Y. TIMES
ECONOMIX BLOG, (May 16, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/16/
economics-for-sale/?hp.
43 See Kwak, supra note 31.
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the purpose of protecting the environment, for example.44  Hence, there
is likely to be a general disposition in favor of the industry from the
outset.  Kwak also demonstrates how cultural capture works through
three mechanisms.  First, regulators identify with the more powerful and
“are more likely to adopt positions advanced by people whom they per-
ceive as being in their in-group.”45  Second, financial regulators have a
tendency to value status: “[r]egulators are more likely to adopt positions
advanced by people whom they perceive to be of higher status in social,
economic, intellectual, or other terms.”46  Third, ongoing relationships
are important, as “[r]egulators are more likely to adopt positions by peo-
ple who are in their social networks.”47
These overall dynamics nurture a kind of “consanguinity” among
the captains of industry—the heads of political and regulatory depart-
ments, from which lesser committees, officials, and corporate officers
continuously take their lead,48 as well as many academics.  This may
generate a collective cognitive bias, known as “intellectual hazard,” in
which different views are not even perceived, let alone recognized and
properly analyzed.49
Given the “situational” context of financial regulation and the deep
structures that shape and influence regulatory outcomes, it seems that the
financial regulatory system is suffering from deep capture.  The power of
the financial industry—particularly that of the big banking conglomer-
ates—looms large in the shaping of general public policy and specific
regulatory action.  This is evident from the phone logs of current and
44 Id. at 16–17.  In this regard one may distinguish the new Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau, supra note 21, because, unlike the other financial agencies (with a possible excep-
tion of the FDIC) it was set up to protect consumers, not the industry itself.  This is perhaps
one of the reasons there has been such fierce opposition to the new agency on the part of the
industry. See also, Kwak, supra note 31, at 17.
45 Kwak, supra note 31, at 12.  Kwak builds on the identity economics work of George
Akerlof, Rachel Kranton and others. See infra note 117.
46 Kwak, supra note 31, at 12.
47 Id.
48 Consider, for example, the recent criticism of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
for its “group think” and being “overly influenced” and “in awe of” the reputation and exper-
tise in larger nations. See Sandrine Rastello, IMF Economists ‘In Awe’ of Rich Nations Missed
Coming Crisis, Audit Finds, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 9, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-02-09/imf-economists-in-awe-of-rich-nations-missed-coming-crisis-audit-finds.html; In-
dep. Evaluation Office [IEO] of the Int’l Monetary Fund, IMF Performance in the Run-Up to
the Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 2004-07 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?img==i6nZpr3iSlU%3d&mappingid=
DRx2VaDG7EY%3d (discussing the IMF’s surveillance during the years leading up to the
global financial and economic crisis).
49 See Geoffrey Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Bi-
ases in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807,
816 (2010).
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former Treasury Secretaries,50 the very visible revolving doors between
the SEC51 and other financial regulators and industry,52 the origin and
composition of the Federal Reserve Banks,53 statements by the new
50 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. ISAAC, SENSELESS PANIC: HOW WASHINGTON FAILED AMERICA
ch. 13 (2010) (describing the almost exclusive engagement by Treasury Secretary Paulson
with the large financial institutions, including an average of ten calls per day with Goldman
Sachs, and the then-President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, Timothy Geithner, to
the virtual exclusion of other participants in the political process who represented major stakes
in the financial collapse). Compare Jackie Calmes, At Treasury, Geithner Struggles to Escape
a Past He Never Had, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/
20/business/20tax.html (describing how Treasury Secretary Geithner is perceived to be a Wall
Street Insider), with Jo Becker & Gretchen Morgenson, Member and Overseer of Finance
Club: Geithner Forged Close Ties to Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at A1, http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/04/27/business/27geithner.html?pagewanted=all (describing Treasury Sec-
retary Geithner’s very close relationship with Wall Street).
51 See PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES
ETHIC CHALLENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR (May 13, 2011), http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/
reports/financial-oversight/revolving-regulators/fo-fra-20110513.html#Executive%20Sum
mary (report), http://www.pogo.org/tools-and-data/sec-revolving-door-database/ (database)
[hereinafter POGO REPORT]; David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Staff’s ‘Revolving Door’ Prompts Con-
cerns About Agency’s Independence, WASH. POST, May 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/economy/sec-staffs-revolving-door-prompts-concerns-about-agencys-indepen
dence/2011/05/12/AF9F0f1G_story.html (discussing the POGO report and the danger of docil-
ity on the part of the SEC as a result of employee departures for businesses subject to SEC
regulation).
52 See, e.g., Paula Reid, Goldman Sachs’ Revolving Door, CBS NEWS INVESTIGATES
(Apr. 7, 2010, 6:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_162-20001981-10391695.
html (“A CBS News analysis of the revolving door between Goldman and government reveals
at least four dozen former employees, lobbyists or advisors at the highest reaches of power
both in Washington and around the world.”); Gabriel Sherman, Revolver, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 10,
2011), http://nymag.com/news/business/wallstreet/peter-orszag-2011-4/; Matthew Leising &
Shannon D. Harrington, Goldman Sachs Hires New York Fed’s Lubke, Pointman on Deriva-
tives Reform, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-12-
15/goldman-sachs-hires-new-york-fed-s-lubke-pointman-on-derivatives-reform.html; Jason
Linkins, Peter Orszag’s Move from the White House to Citigroup Should Definitely Trouble
You, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2010, 5:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
12/16/peter-orszag-white-house-citigroup-troubling_n_797648.html?view=screen; Tom Mc-
Ginty, SEC ‘Revolving Door’ Under Review, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010, at C1, http://profes
sional.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703280004575309061471494980.html?mod=wsj
proe_hps_TopMiddleNews; Tom McGinty, Staffer One Day, Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 5, 2010, at C1, http://professional.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230345070457516
0043010579272.html (describing numerous instances of, and growing concerns about, the
movement from regulatory agencies and key government positions to positions within the in-
dustries that are directly regulated and affected by those governmental roles).  The financial
industry is among the top five for hiring congressional and agency staffers. See Revolving
Door: Top Industries, OPEN SECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/revolving/top.php?display=I
(last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
53 From their inception, the Federal Reserve Banks have been owned by and operated
under the strong influence of the member banks.  There are interesting parallels in the current
environment to that which existed during the original creation of the Federal Reserve System
following the Panic of 1907: at that time, progressive reforms were met by a backlash from the
industry, leading to a much less radical set of reforms than outrage generated by the Panic
would have created. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE MARKET’S PERFECT STORM 141–50 (2007) (discussing the aftermath of
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Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee,54 the opposition
by the Treasury Department and other senior members of the Obama
Administration to the imposition of concentration limits on an unstable
and publicly subsidized industry,55 and the inexplicable disregard of
powerful, contrarian economic studies by the Treasury Department that
favors allowing continued growth by gargantuan, high-risk financial con-
glomerates.56  Political spending by the nation’s largest banks alone
dwarfs the lobbying efforts of most other sectors.57  However, the spend-
ing influence does not end there: deep capture seems to be nourished by
collateral institutional interests.58  For example, the “deregulatory” posi-
tion of the financial industry has been heavily supported with allied lob-
bying by groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.59
the Panic, which led to the eventual enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913). The
Congress that enacted the Dodd–Frank Act appeared set, particularly in the Senate, to strip
away many of the powers of the Federal Reserve System.  Although the ultimate result was to
eliminate the role of member banks in electing the individual reserve bank presidents. See
Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, § 1107.  However, the Federal Reserve System has in fact come
out much stronger than ever before, and its membership will likely continue to promote very
strong industry influence over its actions. But see Marc Labonte, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Systematic Risk and the Federal Reserve, CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Aug. 27, 2010), available at http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/
files/240/CRS-R41384.pdf (“Although the act could be portrayed as an expansion of the Fed’s
powers, the legislation also strips the Fed of certain powers . . . .”).
54 See infra text accompanying note 63.
55 See, e.g., Ryan Grim & Shahien Nasiripour, Senate Votes for Wall Street; Megabanks
to Remain Behemoths, THE HUFFINGTON POST, (June 17, 2010, 4:36 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2010/05/06/senate-votes-for-wall-str_n_567063.html (describing opposition by
the Obama Administration to an amendment that would have required megabanks to be broken
down in size).
56 See, e.g., Simon Johnson, The Financial Stability Oversight Council Defers to Big
Banks, BASELINE SCENARIO (Jan. 20, 2011, 8:56 AM), http://baselinescenario.com/2011/01/20/
the-financial-stability-oversight-council-defers-to-big-banks/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=feed%3A+BaselineScenario+%28The+Baseline+Scenario
%29 [hereinafter Johnson, Financial Stability]; Simon Johnson, Tunnel Vision, or Worse,
From Banking Regulators, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Jan. 20, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://
economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/tunnel-vision-or-worse-from-banking-regulators/
[hereinafter Johnson, Tunnel Vision]; Shahien Nasiripour, Trillion-Dollar Banks Could Get
Bigger Under Financial Overhaul Law, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2011, 7:28 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/18/trilliondollar-banks-could-get-bigger_n_810747.
html (alleging that the Treasury Department has neglected important economic studies and
manipulated powerful contrary data in favor of the position of large financial institutions).
57 See, e.g., AMERICANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM, Wall Street Influence, by the Numbers
(May 14, 2010), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/05/wall-street-influence-by-the-numbers/;
see also Americans for Financial Reform, Post Passage Lobbying Statistics (Aug. 2, 2010,
11:19 AM), http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/2010/08/post-passage-lobbying-statistics/ (describ-
ing the extent of lobbying by various segments of the financial services industry and the re-
lated news reports).
58 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 36, at 219–33 (discussing the development of
extensive institutional, political, and cultural support for corporate interests).
59 See, e.g., Eric Lipton, Mike McIntyre & Don Van Natta, Jr., Large Donations Aid U.S.
Chamber in Election Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
10/22/us/politics/22chamber.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all (describing the extensive mutual fi-
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Furthermore, the particular processes involved in financial regula-
tion suggest that the opportunity for capture might be greater than ever in
financial services, particularly in relation to large-scale financial institu-
tions, which have very deep engagements with the regulators.  Banks are
not only subject to rules that govern their structure, operations, and activ-
ities in advance but they are also subject to ongoing monitoring in a
manner that involves broad regulatory discretion.60  One need not be to-
tally cynical61 to recognize that the highly discretionary and continuous
nature of bank regulation is dependent on and nurtures an environment in
which the regulators and the regulated are engaged in such close, daily
relationships as to nurture intense mutual empathy—perhaps even a kind
of “transference”62—between the two sides.  This codependence might
seem inevitably to lead to a mutual identification of interests and a mani-
festation of deep, if not surface, capture.  Worse, it might even lead to the
kind of lop-sided relationship baldly asserted by incoming House Finan-
cial Services Committee Chairman Spencer Bachus in remarks to the Al-
abama newspaper Birmingham News: “the regulators are there to serve
the banks.”63  In other words, bank supervision provides even more op-
portunity for the kind of influence that leads to capture than traditional
regulation itself.64
Yet this codependence is a fact of political life.  In the face of such
reality, instead of trying to eliminate the existence of ideology and at-
tempts to influence, it would be more effective to create, strengthen, and
nancing support between the Chamber of Commerce, and major financiers and financial insti-
tutions, and the anti-financial regulatory stance of the Chamber).
60 Cf. Christoph Knill & Andrea Lenschow, Modes of Regulation in the Governance of
the European Union: Towards a Comprehensive Evaluation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION:
INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR AN AGE OF GOVERNANCE 218, 231 (Jacint
Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 2004) (“Generally, capture is more likely in cases of highly
detailed regulation.  In such constellations, regulators require a large amount of information in
order to carry out their task.  As the regulated industry itself is the best source of such informa-
tion, this gives the industry a degree of leverage over regulatory arrangements which, in the
extreme case, might lead to capture.”).
61 For an example of this cynicism, see Steve Randy Waldman, Discretion and Financial
Regulation, INTERFLUIDITY (Nov. 16, 2009, 4:40 AM), http://www.interfluidity.com/v2/215.
html (“An enduring truth about financial regulation is this: [g]iven the discretion to do so,
financial regulators will always do the wrong thing.”).  Waldman’s lugubrious view is based
on the political and resource pressures that drive the institutional dynamics of regulator-indus-
try interaction. See id.
62 This is a metaphorical reference to the Freudian notion that in psychoanalysis a patient
redirects feelings for an important person to the analyst.
63 Mary Orndorff, Spencer Bachus Finally Gets His Chairmanship, BIRMINGHAM NEWS
(Dec. 9, 2010, 11:32 AM), http://blog.al.com/sweethome/2010/12/spencer_bachus_finally_
gets_hi.html (“In Washington, the view is that the banks are to be regulated, and my view is
that Washington and the regulators are there to serve the banks.”).  The article goes on to state
that “[Chairman Bachus] later clarified his comment to say that regulators should set the pa-
rameters in which banks operate but not micromanage them.” Id.
64 See id.
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enhance countervailing checks and balances.  We must do something to
try to counteract the massive dominance of the financial industry in our
public life.
II. CREATIVE TURBULENCE AND BALANCING STRUCTURES
One technique for promoting effective and rejuvenating policy in
the complex financial world is to promote and maintain a constant, crea-
tive, and constructive turbulence through transparency, debate, and delib-
eration.  We do not always do this very well: we tend to be least
successful when our theories of government are themselves captured by
simplistic doctrines purporting to explain policy results that appear to
favor one interest group over another as capture,65 or using dichotomous
juxtapositions that treat regulatory failure and market failure as mutually
exclusive.66  Yet our inveterate frailty and frequent failure to achieve
good results does not mean we should abandon the Madisonian ambi-
tion67 of striving to structure a framework conducive to the common
good and channeling the process of policy formulation toward better so-
cial results.
We gain a better understanding of the problems of financial regula-
tion by treating attempts at capture as an expected, and in the right con-
text sometimes even healthy,68 tactic of policy participants that are
channeled through institutions and practices designed to balance their
impact.  In this respect, it can be helpful to adopt a complexity view of
the process of policy formation and the techniques for promoting the best
policy over time.69  From a complexity perspective, policy formation is a
continuous process, not a static end result.70
65 See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 36, at 177–79 (discussing how we “[g]et[ ]
[o]urselves [w]rong” by overestimating the extent to which a person’s behavior is caused by
internal, dispositional factors and underestimating the influence of the situation).
66 See Joseph Heath, An Adversarial Ethic for Business or When Sun-Tzu Met the Stake-
holder, 72 J. BUS. ETHICS 359, 371 (2007) (describing the business tendency to create market
failures and oppose regulations that aim to correct those market failures).
67 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the challenge for a republican
government in addressing the problem of “factions,” groups of citizens united by a common
passion or interest that is adverse to the interests or rights of the community).
68 SUSAN E. WOODWARD, REGULATORY CAPTURE AT THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION 18 (1998), available at http://www.sandhillecon.com/pdf/Regulatory
Capture.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2011).
69 See Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Regulation in the Amoral Bazaar, 128 S.A. L. J.
253, 257–64 (2011) (defining complexity theory).
70 See, e.g., Whitt, supra note 25, at 499 (describing policy formation as an evolving
process without a permanent outcome); Richard S. Whitt & Stephen J. Schultze, The New
“Emergence Economics” of Innovation and Growth, and What it Means for Communications
Policy, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. LAW 217, 304–06 (2009) (describing the need for
adaptive regulation in the rapidly evolving field of telecommunications).  A similar approach
applies to the world of financial services—for the author’s attempt to apply complexity theory
to general regulatory technique, see Baxter, Adaptive Regulation, supra note 69 (outlining an
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One of the most perplexing challenges of regulatory policy forma-
tion is reconciling the important disposition toward other regulatory, or
“public”71 action with the necessity of informed policy.  One can hardly
demand that regulators be free of industrial influence.72  It would be rash,
for example, to insist that only totally impartial outsiders design and set
the rules for such complicated infrastructures as derivatives exchanges,
uninformed by the heavy input of industry participants.  The derivatives
industry itself should have deep influence on this process.  At the same
time, how do we prevent the regulators from being overwhelmed by
high-paid lobbyists and liaison organizations whose purpose is to aggres-
sively persuade the regulators that their organization’s point of view is
the only correct one?  How do we encourage independent thinking on the
part of regulators?  We cannot rely on the cacophony of competing, often
one-sided, heavily funded, and partisan comments alone.
Some solutions might actually be more traditional than narrow cap-
ture models of economic analysis, using stylized frameworks,73 would
suggest.  Like any complex process, stability depends on the interaction
of a diverse range of forces, many of which we have instinctively nur-
tured for decades, even centuries.74  Unfortunately, resilient solutions to
each problem tend toward obsolescence as competing agents learn how
to game the structures and processes.75  Therefore, constant adaptation is
approach to adaptive regulation and citing numerous fuller discussions).  For a good general
introduction to complexity theory and the law, see J.B. Ruhl, Law’s Complexity: A Primer, 24
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 885 (2008).
71 For a much more sophisticated analysis of the distinction between public and private
action, and between general and special interests, see Levine & Forrence, supra note 5, at
174–82.
72 See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 68, at 1–2 (discussing how the complexity of the
securities industry makes it more effective to have a regulator that is already familiar with
these complexities).
73 On the narrowness of stylized economic analytical models, see for example, David
Colander, Complexity and the History of Economic Thought 3 (Middlebury Coll., Dept. of
Econ., Working Paper No. 08-04, March 2008), available at http://sandcat.middlebury.edu/
econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0804.pdf (“All economists know the economy is complex—very com-
plex.  That is one of the reasons why society needs economists—to try to make that complex-
ity somewhat simpler and more understandable.  In that endeavor conventional economics has
seen itself as a conventional science; it takes complexity and simplifies it by finding a formal
structural analytic model—an equation, or set of equations—that fits the data.  The model is
then tested by comparing the predictions of the model with the empirical data, using formal
statistical techniques.  These models are generally linear and static, since they are only ones
with unique, deterministic solutions.  To test the models classical statistical tests are generally
used.”).
74 See, e.g., infra notes 81–94 and accompanying text.
75 See Baxter, Adaptive Regulation, supra note 69, at 12–16 (“For every ‘command’
there is likely to be a corresponding reaction that creates yet a new situation to which the
‘commander’ must react.  One-way direction becomes ineffective.”).
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needed to sustain a process that seeks to promote the greatest social
welfare.76
Combining various dimensions of reform is probably a prerequisite
to achieving an adaptive policy, although the combination would be dif-
ficult to achieve in a partisan environment.  There is no simple formula.
A real solution would have to be complex, multidimensional, and would
require a more serious attitude toward regulation than we have culturally
been willing to display.77  The Dodd–Frank Act78 addressed a few
dimensions, but the regulatory reform agenda has still been left with gap-
ing omissions.79
A. Important Methods for Reform
On the one hand, we should accept the obvious: all agents, includ-
ing industry, consumers, and taxpayers will have influence.  On the other
hand, we should try to avoid disproportionate or undue influence by any
one sector over the others, while recognizing that all agents will try to
impose that influence.80  Essentially, we should seek to establish and pre-
serve a system that is resilient over time.  We should seek a system that
ebbs and flows, but does not swing so far in one direction that it ends up
excluding or disregarding other legitimate interests.  In addition, we
should seek a system that leads to an end result of real capture.  Perhaps,
in an age of “corporatocracy,” it is already too late for us to succeed.
However, assuming reform is still worth trying, the following dimen-
sions seem most relevant.
76 See Whitt, supra note 25, at 495–99 (advocating adaptive policymaking).
77 For a discussion of the failure to display this serious attitude towards regulation, see
Lawrence Baxter, Capture, THE PARETO COMMONS, May 26, 2010, http://www.theparetocom
mons.com/2010/05/capture/ (“We have to figure out ways to modernize regulation from the
ground up.  This will involve better understanding of the regulatory function through teaching
at our higher institutions of learning.  It will involve the courage to restructure agencies when
changed economic conditions so demand (a courage that has failed Congress in the current
financial reforms).  It will involve developing incentives (not always financial) for the ‘best
and brightest’ and highly skilled young people to go into agencies to help develop the fire-
power required for effective regulation of powerful industries–and earn those industries’ re-
spect.  Modernization would also develop better firewalls between regulators and the
regulated.  And we need to figure out how to extend a proper social respect for the profession
of regulation.  Such respect has existed in America from time to time–for the SEC for exam-
ple, and until recently for the Fed, which were once considered to be elite agencies where
graduates clamored to find positions.”).
78 Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, § 1011.
79 See, e.g., Kim Kraweic, Dodd–Frank: “I’ll Have the Meatless Entre´e, Please”, THE
PARETO COMMONS, July 20, 2011, http://www.theparetocommons.com/2010/07/Dodd-Frank-
“i’ll-have-the-meatless-entree-please”/ (discussing how the Dodd–Frank Act failed to satisfac-
torily address issues relating to the financial crisis).
80 See infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text.
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B. Tripartism
Robert Dahl, in his theory of economic democracy, advocated ex-
tending the principles of participatory democracy into the realm of eco-
nomic activity as a means of maintaining a balance within corporate
capitalism between liberty and equality.81  The notion is relevant for cur-
rent purposes because one of the factors that creates a climate ripe for
capture is the exclusion of important stakeholders, such as consumers,
taxpayers, smaller financial institutions, and other diffuse interests from
the policymaking process.82  These large institutions have the financial
and political power to secure preferential access to the policymaking pro-
cess.83  Large corporations can, and in the case of the financial industry
do, distort the democratic process through their lobbying power, dispro-
portionate access to high-level government decision-makers, and the
government’s recruitment directly from corporations’ executive layers.84
Charles Lindblom described this phenomenon as “the privileged position
of business.”85
In an attempt to restore balance to the process, scholars have advo-
cated empowering or strengthening the weaker interest groups within the
“iron triangle” of policy making,86 so that they can act as a counter-
weight to these powerful forces, thereby reducing the likelihood of cap-
ture.87  Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite propose a model of “tripartism,”
defining this model as a “regulatory policy that fosters the participation
of [public interest groups] in the regulatory process.”88  Under the tripart-
ism model, those groups would have full access to all the information
available to the regulator, a “seat at the negotiating table . . . when deals
are done,” and “the same standing to sue or prosecute under the regula-
tory statute as the regulator.”89
81 ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 91–110 (1985).
82 See id.
83 See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECO-
NOMIC SYSTEMS 170–88 (1977).
84 See id.
85 Id. at 170.
86 The term “iron triangle” is used to refer to the political interaction between “three key
participants in a clearly delineated area of policy-making: the Federal bureaucracy, the key
committees and members of Congress, and the private interest.” GORDON ADAMS, THE IRON
TRIANGLE: THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING 24 (Nancy Sokoloff ed., 1981).
87 IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE ch. 3 (1992) [hereinafter AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGU-
LATION] ; Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment,
16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 435, 439 (1991) [hereinafter Ayres & Braithwaite, Tripartism] (pro-
posing the empowerment of private interest groups to prevent capture).
88 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 87, at ch. 3; Ayres &
Braithwaite, Tripartism, supra note 87, at 441.
89 Id.  For imaginative examples of how tripartism might be applied in financial services
regulation, see for example, Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and
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In providing for a continued role on the part of state attorneys gen-
eral in the enforcement of consumer protection laws against financial
institutions, Dodd–Frank has made a step toward something analogous to
tripartism.90  However, this preservation of state enforcement power is
still dependent on state action, and it is confined to consumer protection
issues.91  There are also organized interest groups for various and diverse
financial interests,92 but they are fragmented and far outgunned by the
spending power of the large financial organizations.93  Without greater
funding for such groups and a revival of the “private attorney general,” a
private citizen or lawyer acting on behalf of the public interest,94 it is
unlikely that individuals or smaller organizations will be able to effec-
tively understand and act upon fuller access to information, let alone in-
fluence unsympathetic regulators or successfully counterbalance the
large-scale industry influence in ensuing legal battles.
C. Limiting the Influence of the Industry Players
One obvious way to contain the degree of influence of financial
institutions is to limit their size and power.95  The large financial institu-
tions are in effect an oligarchy possessed of unprecedented power.96
Numerous commentators, and even very senior regulators, have pro-
posed limitations on the size and complexity of financial institutions, or
even that they be broken into smaller components.97  Yet, all of these
Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy
Regulation, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 842–45 (2010) (discussing extending and enhancing
stakeholder engagement in setting bank capital standards); Robert F. Weber, Combating the
Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk Manage-
ment Approach to Principles-Based Reserving 8 BERKELEY. BUS. L.J., 35, 109–15 (2011) (dis-
cussing a similar extension of stakeholder involvement in setting insurance solvency reserves).
90 See CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, THE DODD–FRANK CT: HOW STATES AND
THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU WILL WORK TOGETHER TO PROTECT CON-
SUMERS, available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Fact%20Sheet%20CFPB%20and%20
the%20States%20Nov%202010%20_3_.pdf  (highlighting the power of states’ attorneys gen-
eral to bring actions against national banks and federal savings associations in order to enforce
consumer protection provisions in the Act, notwithstanding the creation of a new federal en-
forcement agency); see also Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, § 1011 (establishing a new federal
enforcement agency—Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
91 See Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, § 1011.
92 For an example of one of the many interest groups in the financial industry, see THE
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://www.responsiblelending.org/ (last visited Apr. 12,
2011).
93 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., William Rubinstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why it
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (describing the forms, history, and development of the
concept of private attorney general).
95 See, e.g., infra note 97 and accompanying text.
96 See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 39, at ch. 7.
97 For a convenient review of the large number of experts who have advocated breaking
up the banks, see, for example, Virtually All Independent Financial Experts Say That the Size
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proposals have been to no avail because of fierce industry and adminis-
tration opposition.98  Dodd–Frank did expand the concentration cap on
financial institutions,99 but so far the Financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil and the Treasury Department show little inclination to give meaning
to this limit.100
D. Properly Structured and Resourced Agencies
Given that Dodd–Frank101 failed to implement broad-scale regula-
tory consolidation, it seems inevitable that the US financial system will
continue to be governed by a complicated array of regulators.  Indeed,
what little consolidation there was appears to have headed in precisely
the wrong direction.  As discussed earlier, the OTS and OCC, which
were consolidated by Dodd–Frank under the OCC,102 have tended to be
industry cheerleaders, not regulators.103  This is not surprising given their
conflicting missions as both chartering and regulating agencies.  The ob-
servation by columnist Joe Nocera that the OCC “is a coddler, a protec-
tor, an outright enabler of the institutions it oversees,”104 while perhaps
hyperbolic, has some historical support.  A case could be made for sepa-
of Big Banks is Hurting the Economy, WASHINGTON’S BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 7:57 PM), http://
www.washingtonsblog.com/2011/01/virtually-all-of-leading-financial.html.  This view is
shared by the governor of the Bank of England and across the political spectrum. See Johnson,
Financial Stability, supra note 45; see also Lawrence Baxter, Financial Macrophilia and
Shrinking the Banks, THE PARETO COMMONS (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.theparetocommons.
com/2010/09/financial-macrophilia-and-shrinking-the-banks/ (providing a further link to an
important Bank of England study that indicates that the large financial institutions may be
detrimental to economic growth); Arnold Kling, Break Up the Banks, NATIONAL REVIEW
(Mar. 31, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/229442/break-banks/
arnold-kling (expressing a conservative viewpoint and arguing that “[b]ig banks are bad for
free markets”); Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-
Antitrust Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE L. J. 1368 (2011) (proposing a radical
reduction in the permitted size of financial institutions).
98 During the past two years the Chairman of the Board of Governors, Treasury Secre-
tary, and chief executive officers of very large financial institutions have made dozens of
speeches vehemently opposing the notion of limiting the size of financial companies.  For
discussion of many of these statements, see supra note 97.
99 Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, § 622 (imposing a cap on consolidated, risk-weighted
liabilities of a financial institution comprising “10 percent of the aggregate consolidated liabili-
ties of all financial companies”).  The liability cap, initially imposed in the Riegle–Neal Act of
1994, was formerly limited to ten percent of insured deposits.  Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328; 108 Stat. 2338 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006)).
100 See Johnson, Tunnel Vision, supra note 56, at 3 (commenting on the neglect by the
Treasury Department of the economic evidence in support of breaking up the banks); Nasiri-
pour, supra note 56 (noting that the concentration limits themselves do not apply to all banks).
101 See Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173.
102 Id. tit. III, §§ 311–327.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 14–18.
104 Joe Nocera, Op-Ed, Letting the Banks Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/opinion/19nocera.html.
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rating the regulatory from the chartering functions, not consolidating
them further.
The existence of the Financial Stability Oversight Committee and
the Federal Reserve as means for addressing the systemic and other risks
that large financial institutions pose is a promising advance.105  The Fed-
eral Reserve Banks have also been partly reformed.106  Nevertheless,
concerns linger about the industry’s degree of influence over, and bla-
tantly privileged access to, senior regulators.107  Given these concerns, it
is hardly surprising that many support the elimination of the Federal Re-
serve system, which is perceived as a secretive, pro-industry agency.108
Recent efforts to promote greater transparency in the Federal Reserve’s
operations, such as audits and delayed disclosures regarding the provi-
sion of financial assistance to ailing institutions,109 help promote an ac-
countability that might reduce the danger of undue influence,
inappropriate allocations of public support, or decisions that are just
plain wrong.
In the meantime, the problem of regulatory capture is exacerbated
by poor regulatory design.  Reform of the financial regulatory structure
remains far from complete.110
E. Better Institutional Roles for Regulators
We do not take regulation very seriously in the United States, nor
do we treat regulators very well.111  Professors of regulation are hard to
find in the US.  Nor do we accord regulators much status.  Unlike the
UK, we do not give them knighthoods.  They do not get paid much in the
105 See Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, tit. I.
106 Id. § 1107 (eliminating the voting power of member-bank representatives on the
board—Class A directors—from the elections of individual Federal Reserve bank presidents).
107 See supra note 50.
108 See, e.g., RON PAUL, END THE FED, ch. 10 (2009) (arguing for the elimination of the
Federal Reserve).  Ron Paul is a current presidential candidate and now heads the Domestic
Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee. Paul Appointed
Chairman of Domestic Monetary Policy Subcommittee, Dec. 9, 2010, http://paul.house.gov/
index.php?catid=32:2010-press-releases&id=1806:paul-appointed-chairman-of-domestic-mon
etary-policy-subcommittee&option=com_content&view=article (last visited Apr.12, 2011).
109 See Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173, § 1102 (providing for audits of extensions of credit
facilities by the Federal Reserve).
110 For extensive thoughts on better regulatory design to avoid industry capture, see, for
example, Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Regulatory De-
sign, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15(2010). See also DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
AGENCY DESIGN: POLITICAL INSULATION IN THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY,
1946–1997 (Stan. Univ. Press 2003) (describing efforts to use agency design to avoid political
capture).
111 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of serious attitude to-
wards regulation in the United States).
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UK, but at least they are considered important.112  Instead, we pull them
up in front of Congress and beat up on them, so they go and get highly
paid jobs in the private sector.113
Yet, we need regulators who really understand the businesses that
they are regulating, and have the moral authority to persuade and, where
necessary, to coerce, those which they regulate.  In order to attract regu-
lators from the private sector we will have to pay them relatively high
salaries,114 even though we already pay them more than most federal
employees (at least those employed at senior levels in the financial agen-
cies).115  Yet it is doubtful that public sector salaries could ever compete
with those in the private financial sector, at least for equivalent skills.
There might, however, be other ways to address the aspirations of
publicly minded experts.  For one thing, elite, highly skilled personnel
are not always the highest paid.116  In addition, Professors Akerlof and
Kranton have demonstrated that people are incentivized by many values
other than mere monetary compensation.117  For example, Professor Car-
penter has demonstrated how reputation and prestige have enhanced the
quality of the Food and Drug Administration.118  Similarly, the SEC
112 See Natalie Holt, Regulator’s Salaries Leap by 22% Over Five Years, MONEY MAR-
KETING (Mar. 10, 2011, 9:45 AM), http://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/regulation/regulators-
salaries-leap-by-22-over-five-years/1027508.article.  In 2010, the lowest level UK regulators
made £34,702 per year and supervisors made £48,263 per year. See Kern Alexander, UK
Corporate Governance and Banking Regulation: The Regulator’s Role as Stakeholder, 33
STETSON L. REV. 991, 993 (2004) (describing the role of UK regulators in British corporate
governance).
113 See R.A. You Get What You Pay For, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 19, 2010, 3:08 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2010/09/regulation (discussing how many reg-
ulators go into the private sector for higher compensation).
114 See id.
115 Senior executive service (SES) officers are exempt from the federal pay grades. See
Federal Pay, PARTNERSHIP FOR PUBLIC SERVICE, http://www.makingthedifference.org/federal
benefits/federalpay.shtml (last visited Sept. 7, 2011).  The banking agencies tend to have
higher pay-for-performance scales than the average federal agency. See, e.g., Careers at the
OCC, Salaries, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/
about/careers/salaries.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2011); Careers at the Federal Reserve, Sala-
ries, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, http://www.federalreserve.gov/careers/salary.htm (last visited
Aug. 26, 2011).
116 See, e.g., Baxter, Capture, supra note 77 (discussing how the U.S. Navy Judge Advo-
cate General’s (JAG) Corps and Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor (NSFTI) programs
employ highly-skilled employees, but pay them significantly less than in the private sector).
117 GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: HOW OUR IDEN-
TITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 48–51 (Princeton Univ. Press 2010).
Many factors other than salary also influence performance in private firms.  Companies often
excel competitively because they are driven by superior employee culture, even when the
salaries are not competitive with other companies. See id.
118 See CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER, supra note 6.
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could reduce its susceptibility to industry capture through leadership and
prestige.119
F. Transference, Appearances, and Disclosures
Louis Brandeis’ famous statement that “sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants”120 remains as valid today as it ever was.  We have
made great strides, albeit not always in a straight line, toward rendering
the regulatory process more transparent.121  Bank supervision requires
detailed inspection, observation and examination on the part of regula-
tory officials.  Yet, even under the glare of modern publicity, this intense
interaction between financial regulators and the industry carries with it a
constant danger of “transference”:122 regulators begin to think like the
regulated and in the process, lose their critical detachment.123  Indeed,
transference is the reason that dictatorial regimes rotate their prison
guards—lest these guards begin to develop too great a sympathy for their
prisoners.  The French have a saying that captures the problem: “to un-
derstand all is to forgive all.”
Currently, regulators spend years at the same large institutions,
often working in offices on the very same floors as the offices of those
whom they regulate.124  One illustration of this closeness can be seen by
observing the Treasury Secretary whom continually seems to talk to the
119 See, e.g., Lawrence Baxter, Capture III: Authority and Prestige, THE PARETO COM-
MONS (June 17, 2010), http://www.theparetocommons.com/2010/06/capture-iii-authority-and-
prestige/.  At the same time, it would be important to measure this prestige against public
service, and not by reference to the large compensation to be earned in the financial industry
itself; otherwise the danger of “cultural capture” would quickly displace any benefits to be
gained from such prestige. See supra text and accompanying notes 44–48.
120 Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, available
at http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196.
121 See, e.g., Dodd–Frank Act, H.R. 4173.
122 See supra note 62.
123 See Philip D. Broughton, New Rules of Engagement for Banks and Regulators (Jan. 5,
2011), http://philipdelvesbroughton.com/2011/01/05/new-rules-of-engagement-for-banks-and-
regulators/ (“Critics argue, however, that too close a relationship can lead to a blurring of the
lines between regulator and regulated.”).
124 See JOHN KEEL, REP. NO. 09-049, AN AUDIT REPORT ON THE DEP’T OF SAVINGS &
MORTGAGE LENDING (2009), available at http://www.sao.state.tx.us/Reports/report.cfm/report/
09-049 (“The [Texas] Department [of Savings and Mortgage Lending] does not consistently
rotate the examiners or the examiners in charge when it performs examinations of the institu-
tions it regulates.  Fifteen (75 percent) of 20 institutions were examined by the same examiners
for at least three consecutive years.”); see also Gillian G.H. Garcia, Failing Prompt Corrective
Action, 11 J. BANK REG. 171, 189 n.40 (2010) (citing a report by the Treasury Department
Office of the Inspector General noting the failure to rotate regulators of a failed bank).  Prac-
tice might vary at the FDIC, where the chairman has emphasized the importance of rotating
examiners. See, e.g., Dan Langdon, From the Examiner’s Desk . . . The FDIC’s Relationship
Manager Program: A Win/Win Situation, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., http://www.
fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin05/examiners_desk.html (last up-
dated Dec. 6, 2005) (“Most banks are examined on a rotating basis by the FDIC. . . .”).
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same CEOs and did so, as President of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank, long before ascending to his current post.125  We have to consider
ways to insert rotation in the deployment of supervisors and to promote
broader consulting by senior officials.126  It seems, for example, that cer-
tain prominent financial institutions are over-represented at the highest
levels of the executive.127
G. The Revolving Door
As both our need for expert regulators and the skill of regulators
increase, the doors between regulators and the industry will spin
faster.128  If we are to engage in technical regulation at all, this is not
only unavoidable, but sometimes even desirable.  But revolving doors are
also dangerous: many current examples vividly highlight the unseemly
appearance, if not reality, of an incestuous relationship between regula-
tors and industry that must surely risk fostering an improper influence of
industry over the regulators.129
Formal ethical rules barring direct engagement on matters where
regulators have already been on the industry side can help to reduce this
improper influence.  Such rules, however, are inevitably limited in their
effect: as such rules become more absolute, the career paths for incoming
or outgoing regulators would become less valuable because part of the
value former regulators bring to private industry is that their privileged
access to, and networks within, the agencies they leave.  Here too ap-
pearances are extremely important.  Prudence suggests that former regu-
lators should simply avoid involvement with a matter that their new
employer is dealing with, if that regulator was involved in developing or
applying the policy or decision in question.  Yet it is doubtful that many
employers, public or private, could honestly claim that they rigorously
uphold this firewall.  There are various ways in which the detrimental
effects of the revolving door could be reduced, ranging from outright
exclusion of the employee from subsequent agency access to requiring
post-employment statements to be made publicly available.130
125 See supra note 50 (referencing descriptions of continual and intense interactions be-
tween the Treasury Secretary and powerful industry executives).
126 See Eleanor Bloxham, The SEC Still Needs to Escape Regulatory Capture.  Here’s
How, CNN MONEY, Jul. 30, 2010, http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/30/markets/SEC_regulatory
_capture.fortune/index.htm (stating that regulators fail when they make decisions based only
upon the input of those whom they regulate).
127 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
128 See id.
129 See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
130 For possible reforms, see, for example, POGO REPORT and supra note 51, at 28–31
(identifying a series of proposed reforms as the problem of revolving door relates to the SEC
and other financial regulatory agencies).
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Perhaps even more important than ethical rules is an ethical culture
in which former regulators, or regulators recently hired from the indus-
try, would regard their involvement on such a matter as simply wrong.131
Yet this ethical culture is not one that we have actively promoted or
celebrated for some time.132
H. Independent Reviews
The venerable notion of checks and balances has not lost its
value.133  Congressional hearings, when not abused, help promote ac-
countability for the implementation of regulations.134  Inspectors General
perform a valuable (and lately much needed) role in unearthing mistakes
and inappropriate conduct by agencies and their decision makers.135  Ju-
dicial review operates as a powerful check on errant rules and orders.136
However, the focus by such external reviewers, applying such ex-post
reviews, is largely on the possibility of unlawfulness, rather than on
whether the regulatory actions taken are the most optimal.137  Scholars
have also made interesting proposals for greater ex ante review by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Admin-
istration.138  On the other hand, this proposal has also been rejected be-
cause it might actually increase the danger of capture given the fact that
OIRA tends to be concerned with matters most important to the Presi-
131 See, e.g., Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View
From a Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735 (2010) (exploring our
collective cultural moral lapse as a major contributor to the financial crisis); Baxter, Adaptive
Regulation, supra note 69, at 271 (“Markets cannot long survive without moral precepts.”); see
also Arnold Kling, The Financial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 507 (2010) discussing the degree to which moral failings, as opposed to cognitive
deficiencies, were a causative factor in the financial crisis).
132 See Kling, supra note 131 at 517 (“[I]t has lately been unfashionable to focus on
market morality and ethics . . .”); id. at 520 (“Recent events have seen a sad shortage of ethical
behavior . . .”).
133 See, e.g., infra notes 138–41.
134 See, e.g., Symposium: The Most Disparaged Brach: The Role of Congress in the
Twenty-First Century: Panel VI: Toward a More Responsible Congress?: Can Enhanced
Oversight Repair “the Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 756 (2009) (reviewing the value of
congressional oversight of administrative agencies, including through committee hearings).
135 See, e.g., About the OIG, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/ig/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (describing the
role of the Office of the Inspector General in overseeing agency actions).
136 See Baxter, Adaptive Regulation, supra note 69, at 3 (noting how “the courts, through
the process of judicial review” can check whether government agency actions have been “au-
thorized by properly delegated discretion”).
137 See id. at 4 (noting the complexities and difficulties of making government action
more legitimate and stating that this has caused agencies to instead deregulate in order to avoid
the problem).
138 See, e.g., Kwak, supra note 33, at 30–31; Nicholas Bagley & Richard Revesz, Cen-
tralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006).
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dent, and these in turn tend to be the concerns of the most powerful in the
industry.139
Perhaps what is needed is ex-ante review by an independent, even
non-governmental institution.  Here we might draw lessons from the MI-
TRE Corporation—a federally funded research and development center,
spun off from the MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 1958, that performs re-
search on national defense issues.140  MITRE describes itself as a “not-
for-profit corporation, chartered to work solely in the public interest.”141
MITRE operates federally funded research and development centers
sponsored by the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, the Internal Revenue Service and Department of Veterans Affairs
(jointly), and the Department of Homeland Security.142  Over the years,
the organization’s scope of activities has steadily been expanded to pro-
vide objective research, testing, and advice on wider scientifically-ori-
ented issues, including: organizational issues for the Department of
Veterans Affairs, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, and the
SEC.143
MITRE, or a similar organization, could be used to assess the op-
timality of regulations governing the financial industry.  The use of MI-
TRE or a similar organization could be funded out of the assessments
levied on financial organizations via the Federal Reserve and federal de-
posit insurance systems, which provide the lynchpins of stability for the
financial industry.144  No doubt we would hear an outcry against this
idea, with industry protesting their lack of access, regulators disliking
their loss of complete control, and politicians complaining about added
costs.  However, if we really wanted the right decisions, this institutional
review structure might actually help to professionalize financial
regulation.
The connection between regulators and industry is the area that
seems to need the most urgent attention.  There are, of course, many
other interconnected issues that would have to be explored in order to
reset financial regulation so that it is directed toward the promotion of
139 Barkow, supra note 110, at 35.
140 Corporate Profile, MITRE CORP., http://www.mitre.org/about/index.html (last visited
Apr. 13, 2011).
141 Working in the Public Interest, MITRE CORP., http://www.mitre.org/about/ffrdcs.html
(last visited Apr. 13, 2011)
142 See id.
143 See Center for Enterprise Modernization (CEM), MITRE CORP., http://www.mitre.
org/about/ffrdcs/cem.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2011).
144 Bank supervision and deposit insurance is funded from fees charged to the financial
institutions under supervision.
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the common good.145  Nevertheless, even the reforms already discussed
would require a major resolve of our collective will in order to transcend
the deeply embedded political, cultural, and institutional power of the
financial industry itself.  Until we make such a resolution, however,
pointing out and lamenting regulatory capture adds little to the overall
debate, and it only makes us angry, cynical, or despondent.
145 Kwak, for example, suggests the use of negotiated rulemaking, which would require
competing interest groups to join the regulators in deciding final rules, thereby perhaps equal-
izing the power of interest groups.  Kwak, supra note 31, at 30.
